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Abstract
People frequently engage in dishonest behavior at a cost to others, and it is
therefore beneficial to study interventions promoting honest behavior. We
implemented a novel intervention that gave participants a choice to promise to
be truthful or not to promise. To measure cheating behavior, we developed a
novel variant of the mind game—the dice-box game—as well as a child-friendly
sender–receiver game. Across three studies with adolescents aged 10 to 14 years
(N = 640) from schools in India, we found that promises systematically lowered
cheating rates compared with no-promise control conditions. Adolescents who
sent truthful messages in the sender–receiver game cheated less in the dice-box
game and promises reduced cheating in both tasks (Study 1). Promises in the
dice-box game remained effective when negative externalities (Study 2) or incen-
tives for competition (Study 3) were added. A joint analysis of data from all three
studies revealed demographic variables that influenced cheating. Our findings
confirm that promises have a strong, binding effect on behavior and can be an
effective intervention to reduce cheating.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
People engage in dishonest behavior such as filing taxes incorrectly
(Slemrod, 2007) or cheating on academic assignments (McCabe,
Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001). Studying cheating in real-world settings
is difficult when using self-reports, as it is unclear whether cheaters
can be trusted to report truthfully on their cheating behavior. A
number of tasks have therefore been devised to obtain objective
measures of dishonesty, for example, deviation of self-reported,
incentivized coin flips or dice rolls from statistically expected
outcomes (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Houser, Vetter, & Win-
ter, 2012; Rosenbaum, Billinger, & Stieglitz, 2014). These measures
have been validated by demonstrating their correlation with real-
world cheating behaviors as diverse as absenteeism from work,
fare-dodging, misbehavior at school, or failure to return overpaid
money (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018; Dai, Galeotti, & Villeval, 2018; Hanna
& Wang, 2017; Potters & Stoop, 2016).
Developmental studies suggest that children first begin to show
dishonest behavior during the preschool years (Lee, 2013; Lewis,
Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999). It increases during
middle and late childhood, and then decreases during adolescence
(Evans & Lee, 2011; Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015; Maggian &
Villeval, 2016). This produces an inverted U-shaped developmental
curve, with adults being at least partly dishonest (Abeler, Nosenzo, &
Raymond, 2019; Gerlach, Teoderescu, & Hertwig, 2019; Gneezy,
2005; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Although self-serving dishonesty
generally decreases from late childhood to adolescence, more sophisti-
cated forms of dishonesty (such as white lies to benefit others) have
been shown to increase during this period (Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee,
2008; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010).
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Given the costs of dishonesty, there is a societal interest in fac-
tors that promote more honest behavior. Particular attention has
been paid to promises as a means to reduce dishonest behavior in
children and adults (Evans & Lee, 2010; Heyman, Fu, Lin, Qian, &
Lee, 2015; Kataria & Winter, 2013; Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Lyon,
Malloy, Quas, & Talwar, 2008; Quas, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2018;
Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2002; 2004). Promises are defined as
voluntary commitments to perform a specific act in the future
(Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969). There is an ongoing debate on why
there exists an obligation to perform a promised act (Habib, 2018).
Some philosophers have argued that promises are binding because of
a social contract that everyone benefits from and thus everyone
has an obligation to uphold (Rawls, 1955). Other theorists have
suggested that promises are binding because others expect and trust
that one will perform the promised action and violating others' trust
causes harm (Scanlon, 1990). More recently, philosophers have
suggested a hybrid account according to which trust in promises
arises due to social conventions and breaking one's promise violates
the established trust (Kolodny & Wallace, 2003). These theoretical
debates are mirrored by different stances in the behavioral sciences
with some researchers suggesting that promises are binding because
of a preference for keeping one's word (Ellingsen & Johannesson,
2004; Vanberg, 2008), because of an aversion to disappointing
other's expectations (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), or because of a
combination of both (conditional-expectation account: Ederer &
Stremitzer, 2017; Mischkowski, Stone, & Stremitzer, 2019).
Irrespective of the different stances, research has consistently
found that many people will keep their word—even at a cost to them-
selves (Woike & Kanngiesser, 2019)—and that promises can promote
desirable behaviors in children and adults such as cooperation, help-
ing, recycling, or visits to doctors (Bicchieri, 2002; Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Kanngiesser,
Köymen, & Tomasello, 2017; Kulik & Carlino, 1987; Ostrom, Walker,
& Gardner, 1992; Wang & Katzev, 1990). Promises to tell the truth
become effective in children from 5 to 6 years of age. For example,
Heyman et al. (2015) used a peeking game with a hidden camera and
found that from 5 years of age Chinese children cheated less when
they had promised not to peek. Similarly, 6- to 7-year-old North
American children who had promised to tell the truth revealed more
often that they had played with a forbidden toy (Lyon & Dorado,
2008). Promises to tell the truth increase their effectiveness between
4 to 9 years of age for North American children (Quas et al., 2018)
and, generally, remain effective in adolescence (Evans et al., 2018)
and adulthood (Kataria & Winter, 2013).
Many of these previous studies have forced participants to prom-
ise without an opportunity to opt out of the commitment (Evans &
Lee, 2010; Heyman et al., 2015; Kataria & Winter, 2013; Lyon &
Dorado, 2008; Lyon et al., 2008; Quas et al., 2018; Talwar et al.,
2002, 2004). Yet promises are per definition voluntary commitments
(Searle, 1969). This point is articulated clearly by Rawls (1999, p. 303)
when describing the practice of promising:
“[…] in order to make a binding promise, one must be fully
conscious, in a rational frame of mind, and know the meaning of the
operative words, their use in making promises, and so
on. Furthermore, these words must be spoken freely or voluntarily,
when one is not subject to threat or coercion, and in situations where
one has reasonably fair bargaining position, so to speak. A person is
not required to perform if the operative words are uttered while he is
asleep, or suffering delusions, or if he was forced to promise, or if per-
tinent information was deceitfully withheld from him.”
Forcing people to promise, therefore, relieves them of their obli-
gation to perform the promised act. Moreover, on ethical grounds, it
can be considered a violation of people's autonomy and deliberate
decision making (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017).
Some studies have investigated the effects of promises in free-
form communication, in which one could reasonably expect an
absence of coercion (e.g., Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Servátka,
Tucker, & Vadovič, 2011; Vanberg, 2008). However, these studies
have regularly coded both statements of intent (“I will do X”) and
promises (“I promise to do X”) as commitments. Yet statements of
intent and promises are different types of speech acts. It is perfectly
plausible to utter a sentence such as “I will come to your party, but I
cannot promise”, which only states an intention to do something and
explicitly hedges against circumstances that may hinder the fulfilment
of this intention (e.g., other obligations and change of mood). This
illustrates that statements of intent cannot be considered unambigu-
ous and firm expressions of commitment.
In the current study, participants had a choice to promise to be
truthful or to opt out of the promise. First, to measure cheating,
we implemented a novel variant of the mind game (Jiang, 2013;
Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017; Potters & Stoop, 2016; Rahwan, Hauser,
Kochanowska, & Fasolo, 2018; Shalvi & de Dreu, 2014): participants
received a box with 16 dice in a 4 × 4 grid (see Figure 1). They were
instructed to privately pick one of the 16 locations, to shake the box,
and to write down the number of eyes on the chosen die. This setup
gives participants the opportunity to secretly switch to locations with
more favorable outcomes. As such switches are unobservable, the
task does not require privacy booths (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011;
Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), deception, or hidden cameras
(Evans & Lee, 2010; Heyman et al., 2015; Markiewicz & Gawryluk,
2019; Talwar et al., 2002). Participants played the game repeatedly
across 15 rounds and received prizes based on the total number of
eyes on the 15 reported dice (one die per round). Given the known
probability distribution of die roll outcomes, this allowed us to esti-
mate dishonesty on the group level and with some precision even on
the individual level.
To implement the promise intervention, participants had a choice
at the start of the dice-box task between (a) receiving 1 point per eye
conditional on making a promise to tell the truth about the number of
eyes on their chosen die or (b) receiving 0.5 points per eye without
any conditions. The promise option thus always resulted in higher
pay-offs compared with the no-commitment option. We chose these
incentives so that even potentially dishonest participants had a reason
to choose the promise option. Although we incentivized participants
to choose the promise option, we did not force them to promise as it
was ultimately the participants' decision to opt for the higher pay-off
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and promise. Moreover, we explicitly used the word “promise” to
invoke a commitment and left no ambiguity about the nature of the
commitment. We also included a control condition (between subjects),
in which participants had a choice between payments of 0.5 points
and 1 point per eye without requiring or mentioning a promise for
either choice option. We included a choice between the same pay-
offs as in the promise condition to control for possible effects this
choice may have had on participants' honesty. Comparing reported
outcomes in the promise condition and the control condition allowed
us to estimate the effectiveness of the promise intervention. A similar
design was recently implemented in a different task with US partici-
pants (Woike & Kanngiesser, 2019). Instructions in the control condi-
tion made no reference to truth telling and, arguably, did not make it
explicit that cheating would be an option (Kajackaite & Gneezy,
2017). If anything, this difference in instructions should make it harder
to show an effect of promises. Nevertheless, we expected that partici-
pants in the control condition would be aware of the possibility to
cheat and make use of it—similar to previous cheating studies that did
not explicitly mention the option to cheat (Jiang, 2013; Potters &
Stoop, 2016).
To measure the effectiveness of the promise intervention, we
conducted three studies with adolescents (N = 640) in schools in
India. The Indian context is unique regarding the severity of cheating
in academic settings and the creativity of preventive countermeasures
(BBC World News, 2015; The Guardian, 2016, 2018). Furthermore, in
India, academic cheating has its parallels on the societal level, for
example, only a small fraction of the population reportedly pays
income tax (The Times of India, 2016). A recent worldwide study with
university students (excluding India) showed that higher societal levels
of tax evasion and corruption correlated with increased cheating in an
experimental dice-rolling task (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Previous work
has also found that cheating in an experimental task predicted school
misconduct in Swiss students (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018). Despite the
relevance of the Indian context for studying cheating behavior and
interventions, few rigorous studies have been conducted in India
(Gerlach et al., 2019; for an exception, see; Hanna & Wang, 2017)
and, to our knowledge, none with adolescents. This seems particularly
striking given that as of 2018, there were about 250 million adoles-
cents in India, which corresponds to 20.4% of the world's adolescents
(UNICEF, 2019). By focusing on Indian adolescents in our study, we
thus contribute to reducing the Western Educated Industrialized Rich
Democratic (WEIRD) sampling bias in the behavioral sciences and psy-
chology (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner,
& Legare, 2017).
In addition to the dice-box task, we included a child-friendly vari-
ant of a sender–receiver game in Study 1, in which participants could
send free-form messages to other participants. This allowed us to test
for correlations between two types of dishonesty: towards the experi-
menter (in the dice-box task) and another participant (in the sender–
receiver task). In Study 2, we introduced a negative externality
(Maggian, 2019; Meub, Proeger, Schneider, & Bizer, 2016): each point
claimed by the participant reduced the gain of another student in the
same school. In Study 3, we created intergroup competition
(Charness, Masclet, & Villeval, 2014; Vriend, Jordan, & Janssen, 2016)
by randomly assigning participants to virtual groups and awarding a
special attractive prize to the group of participants with the highest
overall point score. In each study, we also asked participants to fill in
an honesty self-report and collected sociodemographic variables from
their parents (e.g., parental education and faith) that we entered in a
joint analysis of the dice-box data from all three studies.
To summarize, in a series of three studies, we make several con-
tributions to the literature: (1) we implemented child-friendly variants
of the mind game and the sender–receiver game to measure cheating
behaviors, (2) we studied the relation between different cheating
measures, (3) we investigated the effectiveness of an incentivized,
nonforced promise intervention, (4) we studied this intervention out-
side the lab in school settings, (5) we conducted our study in India,
where a societal concern about cheating in academic settings is preva-
lent, and (6) we worked with Indian adolescents that are still largely
under-represented in behavioral studies, despite comprising a fifth of
the world's adolescents.
2 | STUDY 1
Adolescents participated in the dice-box game, a child-friendly
sender–receiver game, and they completed an honesty self-report.
Half of the participants were assigned to the promise and the control
condition, respectively. Participants played both games in the same
condition. We implemented the promise condition in the dice-box
game as described in Section 1. In the sender–receiver game, partici-
pants first acted as senders and then as receivers (within-subject
F IGURE 1 Example of a dice box used in the
study—closed (left panel) and open (right panel).
Participants privately picked one of 16 locations,
shook the box, and wrote down the number of
eyes on their chosen die [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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design). Therefore, we included two different game versions: a circle-
game and a squares-game. Senders did not know that they would also
play a variant of the game as receivers later on. In the promise condi-
tion of the sender–receiver game, participants had a choice between
playing the game for a total of (a) 30 points or (b) 60 points condi-
tional on the promise to report the rules truthfully to the receiver
(control condition: the same choice without mentioning of a promise).
2.1 | Methods
2.1.1 | Participants
All participants were recruited from English-speaking medium schools
in Pune, India. Pune is a city with 3.4 million inhabitants in the Indian
state of Maharashtra. Participants in all studies were aged 10 to 14
years. In Study 1, n = 200 adolescents (Mage = 12.6 years, standard
deviation [SD] = 0.92, 96 [48%] females) from three schools partici-
pated in the experiments (for further details, see Table S1 in the
supporting information). One additional adolescent was excluded due
to learning disabilities. All adolescents who had received parental con-
sent were invited to take part in the study1.
The sample size was predetermined. Because our study
implemented novel variants of previous paradigms, we aimed for a
larger sample size than in many previous studies on cheating in ado-
lescents (e.g., Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2010)—but see
the study by Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer (2015) for sample sizes
similar to ours. An additional 24 adolescents took part in piloting ses-
sions to ensure that materials and wordings were age-appropriate and
understood by all participants (these results are not reported). The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Educa-
tion and Psychology at Freie Universität Berlin. Written, informed




Participants were tested in groups of four, seated well apart at
individual tables in their school (for the set-up, see supporting infor-
mation). All adolescents in a group participated in the same condi-
tion (balanced by gender and age for each school). Participants
played two games: (1) the dice-box game and (2) the sender–receiver
game (in fixed order). They also filled in a brief honesty self-report
at the end of the study. All testing was conducted in English by the
second author.
Dice-box game
In the dice-box game, each participant played with a box containing
16 dice in a 4×4 grid. To prepare the materials, we used boxes from a
letter word game and substituted the letter dice with regular dice. The
boxes were taped shut and labeled with “top” and “down” (see
Figure 1). Participants privately picked one of the 16 locations, shook
the box, and wrote down the number of eyes on their chosen die.
The experimenter handed each participant an instruction sheet
that explained the dice-box game (see supporting information). After
participants had read the instructions, the experimenter demonstrated
the task once: she announced her chosen die location to the partici-
pants, shook the box and asked participants to state the number of
eyes on the die in this location. Next, she collected the instruction
sheets, and participants individually answered a set of comprehension
questions to test their understanding of the dice-box game (see
supporting information).
Depending on condition, participants received one of two ver-
sions of an answer sheet on which they could indicate how many
points they would like to receive for each eye on their chosen dice
throughout the game (see supporting information). Participants in the
promise condition had a choice between:
Option A: For each dot, you receive 1/2 point. You have
to do nothing more.
Option B: For each dot, you receive 1 point. You will have
to promise that you will tell the truth about how many
dots there are on your die.
Participants in the control condition instead had a choice
between:
Option A: For each dot, you receive 1/2 point.
Option B: For each dot, you receive 1 point.
Participants in both conditions were also provided with an exam-
ple to illustrate how many points each option would yield (see
supporting information). We also reminded them that all eyes on the
chosen die would be summed up after 15 rounds, that the points
would be exchanged for real prizes, and that the more points they had
the more prizes they would receive (see supporting information).
Once participants had chosen an option, each participant received
a dice box and played the game for 15 rounds. All adolescents in a
group shook their boxes at the same time. For each round, their
answer sheet listed the six possible die outcomes as pictures and par-
ticipants indicated the number of eyes on their chosen die by circling
the respective picture (see supporting information).
Sender–receiver game
In the sender–receiver game, participants played for points that—
similar to the dice game—were later converted into prizes. Participants
first played the part of senders and then—unannounced—the part of
receivers. To test participants in both roles, we used two different ver-
sions of the sender–receiver game: a circle-game and a squares-game.
Half of the senders played the circle-game and half of them played the
squares-game (balanced across conditions). Senders who had played
the circle-game played the squares-game as receivers and vice-versa.
1It is possible that some adolescents did not take part because they were absent on the
testing day or because the sample size had already been reached.
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In the circle-game, the placement of a cross by the receiver inside,
outside, or on the line of a printed circle determined the outcomes for
both sender and receiver (see supporting information). In case the
cross was placed inside the circle, the sender received all the points.
In case the cross was placed on the line of the circle, the points were
equally split between the sender and the receiver. Finally, in case the
cross was placed outside the circle, the receiver was awarded all the
points.
In the squares-game, the receiver had an option to circle one,
two, or three printed squares to determine the outcomes for both
sender and receiver (see supporting information). In case one square
was circled, the sender received all the points. In case two squares
were circled, the points were equally split between the sender and
the receiver. In case three squares were circled, the receiver was
awarded all the points.
In the sender role, participants first read instruction sheets
explaining the general rules of the game (called the “message game”;
see supporting information) as well as the specific rules of the circle-
game or squares-game. The instruction sheets included visualizations
to facilitate comprehension of the game sequence and pay-offs. In
addition, the experimenter repeated the rules to the entire group of
adolescents. Senders learnt that they would play the game with
another student (receiver) from the same school and that both would
remain anonymous to each other. Senders were further told that their
message was the only information about game rules available to the
receiver, and that the receiver's choice would determine the points
for both players. Senders answered a set of comprehension questions
to test their understanding of the sender–receiver game (see
supporting information).
Depending on condition, participants received one of two answer
sheets, on which they could choose for how many points they would
like to play the game (see supporting information)—it should be noted
that we assigned all participants to matching conditions in the dice-
box and the sender–receiver game (promise/promise or con-
trol/control). Participants in the promise condition faced the following
choice:
Option A: Play the game with a total of 30 points. You
have to do nothing more.
Option B: Play the game with a total of 60 points. You
have to promise to the other student that you told the
truth about how to play the game and the consequences
of the decision in the game.
Participants in the control condition instead faced the following
choice:
Option A: Play the game with a total of 30 points.
Option B: Play the game with a total of 60 points.
Once participants had indicated their choice, they wrote an open-
form message to the receiver on a blank piece of paper and handed it
to the experimenter in a sealed envelope.
In the receiver role, participants first received an instruction
sheet that explained their role in the game and included visualizations
to facilitate comprehension (see supporting information). Specifically,
receivers learnt that they would play with another student (sender)
from their school and that the receivers as well as the sender would
remain anonymous. They were also told that they would receive a
message from the sender explaining the rules of the game, and that
their choices would determine the points for both the sender and
the receiver. The instructions also emphasized that the rules of the
game differed from the rules of the game that they had just played
as senders. They then received a sealed envelope with the message
of another participant from their school. They also received an
answer sheet that, depending on the game variant, either showed a
printed circle or three printed squares (see supporting information).
Receivers then indicated their answers either by positioning a cross
(inside, outside, or on the circle in the circle-game variant) or by
drawing a circle around a chosen number of boxes (one, two, or three
in the squares-game variant). We did not tell receivers whether
senders had made a promise or not.
Honesty self-report and sociodemographics
After completing the sender–receiver game in both roles, participants
filled in an honesty self-report by indicating on a 5-point-Likert scale
how strongly they agreed with five different statements (see Table 1
and Figure S2). When giving informed consent, parents provided
sociodemographic information on, for example, their educational
background and faith (for details, see supporting information). We
entered these variables in a joint analysis of the dice-box game data
from Studies 1–3.
2.1.3 | Rewards
Participants played for points but were unaware of the specific
rewards and the conversion rate of points to rewards. We only
handed out rewards after all eligible adolescents in a school had taken
part in the study. In consultation with schools, we rewarded partici-
pants with stationary items (e.g., pencils and erasers). We used a con-
version rate of 14 points per item, and participants received M = 8.2
items (SD = 2.35) in Study 1.
TABLE 1 Items in the honesty self-report
No. Item Polarity
1 Today, I have told the truth in all of my
answers.
Positive
2 When talking to other students, I am
honest.
Positive
3 When talking to teachers, I am honest. Positive
4 Cheating is sometimes necessary in school. Negative
5 Cheating is sometimes necessary in life. Negative
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2.1.4 | Data coding and analyses
Data were analyzed in IBM SPSS (Version 24.0.0.0, 64 bit) and ESCI
(Cumming, 2016).
We report the data from the dice-box game as statistical over-
reporting (hence “over-reporting”). Summed across 15 random dice
rolls, the statistically expected number of eyes is 52.5—assuming hon-
est reporting—and the maximum possible number is 90. We report
results as the deviation of observed from expected outcome (with a
possible maximum of 90 − 52.5 = 37.5 eyes and negative values pos-
sible). Although we cannot know for certain whether someone delib-
erately over-reported their results or was simply lucky; statistically,
any positive deviation from 52.5 eyes is considered over-reporting.
Two independent coders, who were blind to condition, coded the
200 messages sent by participants in the sender–receiver game (see
Table 2 for examples). A message was scored as (a) truthful if the
sender truthfully reported the rules and stated all three pay-off
options or (b) nontruthful if the sender did not truthfully report the
rules and did not state all three pay-off options. There were only two
mismatches between the two coders (across 200 messages coded;
κ = 0.97). These mismatches were moderated by the first author (blind
to condition), who sided once with each coder.
2.1.5 | Data availability
The dice-box task data for all three studies and the sender receiver
game data for Study 1 can be found here: https://osf.io/hzdfe/.
Note that sociodemographic variables were removed to protect
participants' privacy. Data with sociodemographic information
are available upon reasonable request by researchers at academic
institutions.
2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Dice game
Two participants in the promise condition provided incorrect answers
to the comprehension questions for the dice-box task and were
excluded from the analyses. The higher payment option (one
point per eye) was chosen by nearly all participants in the control
condition (n1dc = 98) and by all participants in the promise condition
(n1dp = 98). We restricted analyses to participants who chose the
higher payment rate.
Participants over-reported an average of M = 10.40 eyes
(SD = 7.93) in the control condition (see Figure 2). This corre-
sponds to Mr = 27.7% of the maximum possible over-reported eyes
(i.e., 37.5 eyes), which is close to the average of 21.6% cheating
found in a recent meta-analysis (Abeler et al., 2016). Participants in
the promise condition over-reported an average of M = 7.19 eyes
(SD = 7.99; Mr = 19.2%), a difference of 3.20 eyes (95% confidence
interval [CI] = [0.96,5.45], t(194) = 2.82, p = 0.005, two-sided).
These results are confirmed by a nonparametric test (see
supporting information).
2.2.2 | Sender–receiver game
All participants gave correct answers to the comprehension questions
for the sender–receiver game. The higher payment option was chosen
by the majority of participants in both the control condition (n1sc = 84
participants) and the promise condition (n1sp = 83 participants). Mes-
sages were coded as fully truthful (i.e., communicating all rules and
payment consequences correctly) or as nontruthful. Table 2 shows
some examples of messages participants sent.
TABLE 2 Examples of messages sent by participants in the sender–receiver game in Study 1
No. Example Code Comment
1 If one box is circled, then I will get the point. If two boxes are circled, then
we both will get half points. If all three boxes are circled, then you will get
all points.
True —
2 If there is cross inside circle, I will get point and you nothing will get. If there
is cross on the circle, I will get half point and you will get half point. If
there is cross outside the circle, I will not get any point, all point will be
your.
True —
3 You have a circle in front of you. If there is a cross inside the circle you get
all the points and I get nothing. If there is a cross outside the boundary of
the circle I get all the points. If there is a cross on the boundary of the
circle then I get all the points. Do what you want—choice is yours.
Untrue None of the pay-off options are stated
correctly; the pay-offs for making a cross
inside and outside the circle, respectively,
are presented in inverse.
4 If you do cross in the circle, I will get all the points. If the cross is on the
circle, I will get half point and you will get half point. And if you do cross
outside the circle, no one will get point, you also and me also.
Untrue The sender fails to convey that a cross
outside the circle will deliver all the
points to the receiver.
5 Rules for the game: If one box is circled I will get all the points and you will
get nothing. If two boxes are circled, we both will get half of the points. If
three boxes are circled, you will get all the points and I will get twice of
your points.
Untrue Circling three squares would not give the
sender twice as many points as the
receiver.
188 KANNGIESSER ET AL.
Participants in the promise condition who chose the higher pay-
ment option (i.e., promised to be truthful) sent fewer untruthful mes-
sages (5 out of 83, 6%, 95% CI = [3%, 13%]) than participants who
chose the higher payment option in the control condition (17 out of
84, 20.2%, 95% CI = [13%, 30%]; χ2(1) = 7.37, p = 0.007; see Figure 3).
Conversely, participants who chose the lower rate in the promise
condition (i.e., did not promise to be truthful) sent more untruthful
messages (16 out of 17, 94%, 95% CI = [73%, 99%]) than participants
in the control condition (4 out of 16, 25%, 95% CI = [10%, 50%];
χ2(1) = 16.49, p < 0.001). Across both conditions, participants who
sent a truthful message had a higher score on the honesty self-report
scale (n = 158, M = 3.16, SD = 0.63) than participants who did not
send a truthful message (n = 42, M = 2.83, SD = 0.70, 95% CI(Δ) =
[0.11, 0.55], t(198) = 2.95, p = 0.004).
Next, we analyzed outcomes for senders in the sender–receiver
game by running an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with points received
as dependent variable and main effects of payment choice (30 vs.
60 points), promise given (yes/no), truthful message (yes/no), and the
interaction between promise given and truthful message in the model.
We found significant main effects of truth-telling (F(1,195) = 9.84,
p = 0.002, partial η2 = 0.05) and payment rate choice (F(1,195) = 3.91,
p = 0.049, partial η2 = 0.02), but no significant effect of promise given
(F(1,195) = 0.12, p = 0.73, partial η2 = 0.001) and no significant interac-
tion (F(1,195) = 3.21, p = 0.07, partial η2 = 0.02). Both being untruthful
and choosing the higher pay-off resulted in higher outcomes for senders.
To link the dice game and the sender–receiver game, we con-
ducted an ANOVA with over-reported eyes as dependent variable2
and condition and truth-telling in the sender–receiver game as factors.
We found significant main effects of condition (F(1, 192) = 6.72,
p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.03) and truth-telling (F(1, 192) = 4.82, p = 0.03,
partial η2 = 0.02), but no significant interaction (F(1, 192) = 0.21,
p = 0.65, partial η2 = 0.00). Participants in the promise condition and
those who sent truthful messages over-reported fewer eyes.
3 | STUDY 2
Study 2 investigated the link between cheating behavior and the
consequences of this behavior, in particular, negative consequences
for others. Past research has revealed contradictory findings
regarding the impact of negative externalities on cheating behavior,
with some studies finding reductions in bribery and cheating (Barr
& Serra, 2009; Meub et al., 2016; Senci, Hasrun, Moro, & Freidin,
2019) and others finding no reduction (Abbink, Irlenbusch, &
Renner, 2002; Maggian, 2019). For example, Meub et al. (2016)
reported lower levels of cheating when it harmed another partici-
pant (though effects were nonsignificant). In contrast, Maggian
(2019) found no difference in cheating rates when it reduced the
budget of the experimenter as compared with donations to a char-
ity. In Study 1, cheating in the dice-box task only harmed the
experimenter(s), whereas cheating in the sender–receiver game
resulted in potential harm to another student. Our results indicated
that behaviors in these two games were related, but this does not
allow us to draw any direct conclusions about the role of negative
externalities as the two tasks varied on a range of factors. We
therefore introduced a negative externality into the dice-box task
by announcing that we would subtract each point claimed by the
F IGURE 3 Proportions of messages coded as untruthful split by
condition (control/promise) and by choice of payment rate. Markers
indicate observed proportions with vertical lines showing their 95%
confidence intervals (CIs) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 2 Distribution of over-reporting in Study 1. Dots
represent individual over-reporting scores separated by condition
(jittered vertically for readability only), the boxes show the three
quartiles, and the horizontal lines include the inner 96% of the data.
The colored curves depict a smoothed data distribution for the two
conditions (y-axis corresponds to the relative frequency of scores
above/below the expected average); the blue curve shows the
expected distribution assuming randomly selected dice (with a mean
of zero) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
2We excluded the four participants who chose the lower payment rate in the dice-box game
or who failed the control questions in that game.
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participant from the fixed endowment of another student in the
same school. Over-reporting thus resulted both in gains for the
participant and losses for another student. If participants are reluc-
tant to inflict costs on peers, we will find that cheating rates are
generally reduced. In addition, participants who are sensitive to
such moral cues may report honestly irrespective of the promise
intervention, rendering it ineffective. Adolescents participated in
the dice-box game and completed an honesty self-report. Half of




All participants were again recruited from English-medium schools in
Pune, India. In this study, n = 200 adolescents aged 10 to 14 years
(Mage = 12.5 years, SD = 0.88, 103 [52%] females) from five schools
participated (for further details, see Table S1). One additional group
of four participants was excluded due to outside interference. The
sample size was predetermined to be the same as in Study 1. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Edu-
cation and Psychology at Freie Universität Berlin. Written, informed
consent had been obtained from parents before adolescents took
part in the study.
3.1.2 | Procedure
The set-up and procedure were similar to those in Study 1 with
the exception that participants only played the dice-box game and
that we introduced a negative externality. Specifically, participants
were told that they would be paired with another student from
their school (identities remained mutually anonymous), that there
was a limited number of points in the game, and that their gains
would be subtracted from the other student's fixed initial endow-
ment of points (see supporting information). We set the total
endowment to 100 points and allocated the remaining points to
other students in the school who had participated in the game
(but were not tested together with the participant in a group of
four students). Participants filled in the five-item honesty self-
report (see supporting information). We used the same rewards
and conversion rate as in Study 1. Participants received M = 7.1
items (SD = 1.06) in Study 2.
3.2 | Results
One participant in the control condition provided incorrect answers
to the comprehension questions and was excluded from the
analyses. The higher payment option was chosen by the vast
majority of participants in the control condition (n2c = 93
participants) and in the promise condition (n2p = 99 participants).
We restricted analyses to participants who chose the higher pay-
ment rate. Participants over-reported an average of M = 10.53 eyes
(SD = 8.68; Mr = 28.1%) in the control condition and an average of
M = 8.00 eyes (SD = 8.52; Mr = 21.3%) in the promise condition
(see Figure 4), a difference of 2.54 eyes (95% CI = [0.09,4.99],
t(190) = 2.04, p = 0.042). This result is confirmed by a nonparamet-
ric test (see supporting information).
4 | STUDY 3
Competition describes a situation of scarcity, in which achieving one's
goal excludes others from achieving their goal (Deutsch, 1949). Social
comparisons of one's own achievement with that of others can lead
to increased competition (Garcia, Tor, & Schiff, 2013). Past research
has shown that envy for other's achievements can lead to deception
in negotiations (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008) and that situational fac-
tors like ranking systems can increase unethical behaviors (Vriend
et al., 2016), lead to destructive competition (Hafenbrädl & Woike,
2018), sabotage of others' work (Charness et al., 2014), and lower
rates of cooperation (Woike & Hafenbrädl, 2020). In academic con-
texts, a meta-analysis identified a positive relationship between per-
ceived competition for grades and cheating in college students
(Whitley, 1998). Given this, we wanted to test whether participants
would cheat more in our task with competition and, if this were the
case, whether our promise intervention would remain effective. We
created intergroup competition by randomly assigning participants to
groups and awarding a special, attractive prize (gel pens and note-
books) to the group with the highest overall score. Adolescents partic-
ipated in the dice-box game and completed an honesty self-report.
We compared the special-prize group with a no-special-prize group
and assigned half of the participants per group to the promise condi-
tion and half to the control condition, respectively (2×2 between-
subject design).
F IGURE 4 Distribution of over-reporting in Study 2 split by
condition (see Figure 1 for details) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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4.1 | Methods
4.1.1 | Participants
All participants were recruited from English-medium schools in Pune,
India. In this study, n = 240 adolescents (Mage = 11.8 years, SD = 0.91,
120 [50%] females) from three schools participated (see Table S1 for
further details). The sample size was predetermined: we decided on a
larger sample size than in Studies 1 and 2 due to the more complex
design of this study. The study was approved by the ethics committee
of the Faculty of Education and Psychology at Freie Universität Berlin.
Written, informed consent had been obtained from parents before
adolescents took part in the study.
4.1.2 | Procedure
The setup and procedure were similar to those in Study 1 with the
exception that participants only played the dice-box game and that
we introduced a special prize. Specifically, half of the participants
in each condition were assigned to the special-prize condition (see
supporting information): they were randomly assigned to virtual
groups of four students in their school (excluding those from the
same test session) and told that the group with the highest num-
ber of points in their school would win a special prize (i.e., gel
pens and notebooks—established to be highly desired items). Par-
ticipants in the no-special-prize condition received the same
instructions as in Study 1. Overall, this resulted in a 2×2 between-
subject design with 60 participants per cell of the design. Special
prizes were awarded in addition to the individually won prizes. Par-
ticipants again filled in a five-item honesty self-report (see
supporting information). We used the same rewards and conversion
rate as in Study 1 for individual prizes. Participants received
M = 4.7 items (SD = 0.79) in Study 3.
4.2 | Results
All participants gave correct answers to the comprehension questions.
The higher payment option was chosen by all participants in the con-
trol conditions (no-prize: n3npc = 60; prize: n3pc = 60) and by almost all
participants in the promise conditions (no-prize: n3npp = 59; prize:
n3pp = 59). A two-factorial ANOVA with over-reporting as dependent
variable and group (prize/no-prize) and condition (promise/control) as
factors showed a significant main effect of condition (F(1,234)
= 13.26, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.05), but a nonsignificant main effect
of prize (F(1,234) = 0.27, p = .60, partial η2 = 0.001) and no significant
two-way interaction of prize and condition (F(1,234) = 0.03, p = 0.86,
partial η2 = 0.00). Figure 5 demonstrates that the average over-
reporting was, in fact, (nonsignificantly) smaller when a special prize
was offered than when it was not offered. Collapsing across the prize
groups, participants in the control condition over-reported an average
of M = 16.03 eyes (SD = 11.57; Mr = 42.7%), participants in the prom-
ise condition an average of M = 11.09 eyes (SD = 9.12; Mr = 29.6%), a
difference of 4.94 eyes (95% CI = [2.28, 7.60], t(236) = 3.66, p < .001;
see Figure 6). This result is confirmed by a nonparametric test (see
supporting information).
5 | COMBINED ANALYSES ACROSS
STUDIES 1–3
We analyzed the combined dice-box data from Studies 1–3 to test
whether over-reporting was predicted by sociodemographic variables
and by participants' honesty self-reports.
5.1 | Analysis
For our analysis, we simplified the sociodemographics data (see
supporting information): (i) we created a binary variable for siblings
F IGURE 5 Comparison of over-reporting split
by prize group (prize/no prize) with different
colors for each condition (promise/control). Dots
show individual over-reporting scores, curves
show smoothed data distributions, and large dots
connected by lines show the means for each of
the four conditions [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(yes/no; 70% at least 1 sibling), (ii) we did not include school perfor-
mance as we realized that many parents were unable to give a mean-
ingful answer to this question (e.g., students are usually not ranked in
their classes), (iii) we included only the three most frequently men-
tioned types of faith (Hinduism: 87% of the sample; Jainism: 5.6%;
Buddhism: 1.7%) and collapsed all other answers (including no-
answers) into a fourth category (5.6% of the sample), and (iv) we cre-
ated a binary variable for parental education (university degree:
yes/no; 72% of mothers and 68% of fathers had university degrees,
respectively; missing values were replaced with the average across
participants with degree information).
In all three studies, we asked participants to indicate on a 5-point
Likert scale how strongly they agreed with five statements about (dis)
honest behavior (see Table 1). Each item was scored 0–4 with inverse
scoring for negative items. The mean scale score (sum of items divided
by the number of items) was 3.20 (SD = 0.60).
We used the dice-box data from all three studies and included
only participants who had chosen the higher payment, passed the
comprehension checks of the dice-box game, and completed all items
of the honesty scale, nmeta = 622.
We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with (statis-
tical) over-reporting as dependent variable and the following factors
and covariates: condition (promise/control), prize (special prize/no
special prize), negative externality (yes/no), age in years (rounded
to the first decimal), gender, siblings (yes/no), father's degree
(university degree/no university degree), mother's degree (university
degree/no university degree), school, faith, and self-reported
honesty. As in Studies 1–3, over-reporting was defined as the
deviation of observed from expected outcomes across 15 rounds
for each participant.
5.2 | Results
Figure 7 demonstrates that there was a stable effect of promises on
reducing over-reporting across all three studies. The ANCOVA rev-
ealed that promises, school, age, faith, and maternal education had
the strongest effects on over-reporting (see Table 3). Specifically,
promises, age, and maternal degree were related to decreases in over-
reporting. The seven schools varied in their average over-reporting.
The effect of faith is driven by a (relatively small) group of participants
with Buddhist faith who over-reported less. The honesty scale was
negatively related to over-reporting, but not significantly
so. Additional analyses, including Promise × Negative Externality and
Promise× Prize interactions revealed the same significant main effects
(see supporting information).
F IGURE 6 Distribution of over-reporting in Study 3 split by
condition (see Figure 1 for details) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 7 Differences in over-reporting
between control and promise conditions across
studies: points show means for each condition
with 95% confidence intervals (CIs), squares show
means across studies, the diamond reports mean
and 95% CI for the difference shown on a floating
axis (based on Cumming, 2016) [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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In addition, Figure 8 shows that reported dice outcome distribu-
tions did not vary substantially across the fifteen rounds.
6 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across three studies, we found that a novel intervention, which gave
participants a choice to promise to be truthful, reduced cheating
behavior in Indian adolescents aged 10 to 14 years. The promise inter-
vention was effective across two different tasks—a novel variant of a
mind game (the dice-box game) and a child-friendly version of the
sender–receiver game (Study 1). Moreover, the effect of promises
remained stable when we introduced a negative externality (Study 2)
or incentivized intergroup competition (Study 3). Overall, this confirms
that promises have a strong, binding effect on behavior and extends
previous findings with MTurk workers that kept their promise at a
cost to themselves (Woike & Kanngiesser, 2019). Promises can thus
be a powerful intervention to promote desirable behaviors (Bicchieri,
2002; Kulik & Carlino, 1987; Ostrom et al., 1992; Wang & Katzev,
1990) and to curb dishonesty.
Previous studies have investigated honesty-enhancing interven-
tions such as reminders of university honor codes (Mazar et al., 2008)
or reminders not to cheat (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011), appeals to hon-
esty (Talwar, Arruda, & Yachison, 2015), and forced honesty oaths
(Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, & Shogren, 2013; Jacquemet, Luchini,
Rosaz, & Shogren, 2018; Shu, Mazar, Gino, & Bazermann, 2012) or
forced promises (Heyman et al., 2015; Kataria & Winter, 2013).
Across three internal replications, we demonstrated the effectiveness
of a new promise intervention that, in contrast to previously studied
interventions, has the advantage of giving participants an option to
refrain from making a promise. It thereby respects individual auton-
omy and conscious decision making (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017).
Moreover, our intervention clearly and unambiguously marks the
commitment as a promise and is transparent about the nature of the
commitment.
Our promise intervention featured a choice between a lower pay-
off and a higher pay-off under the condition that adolescents prom-
ised to tell the truth. The control condition implemented a similar
choice, but without the promise. We included this incentive to coun-
ter self-selection of potentially honest participants in the promise con-
dition who may want to signal their honesty via promises (Ismayilov &
Potters, 2016; Van den Assem, Van Dolder, & Thaler, 2012). In addi-
tion, the higher payment option created an incentive for potentially
dishonest participants to choose this option and cheat. The vast
majority of participants chose the higher payment option in all condi-
tions, indicating that theses incentives worked as intended. It is possi-
ble that the promise to answer honestly and the fact that participants
were paid more (to be honest) worked in conjunction to create the
observed reduction in cheating in the promise condition. However,
teasing apart the contribution of these two factors would prove diffi-
cult. Giving people simply a choice between a promise to be honest or
no promise without any incentives would create the above mentioned
self-selection of participants. Removing the choice altogether would
force people to promise and undermine the deliberately voluntary
nature of our intervention. Future studies could focus on the control
condition and compare a condition with and without a choice. This
could provide some insight into whether the choice situation by itself
(irrespective of a promise) has an impact on cheating behavior.
Cheating rates have been found to vary across different experi-
mental paradigms (Gerlach et al., 2019), but different paradigms are
rarely presented within-subjects. We established in Study 1 that
truth-telling in a sender–receiver game predicted lower rates of over-
reporting in the dice-box task and that responses on the honesty scale
predicted behavior in the sender-receiver game. However, our com-
bined analyses across all three studies did not reveal an effect of
responses on the honesty scale on over-reporting in the dice-box task.
TABLE 3 Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) results for over-reporting scores across all three studies (nmeta = 622)
Source B Mean sq. df F p part. η2
Intercept 24.06 1166.19 1 14.29 <0.001 0.02
Promise condition (0 = no, 1 = yes) −3.49 1845.71 1 22.61 <0.001 0.04
Prize (0 = no, 1 = yes) −0.41 10.23 1 0.13 0.723 0.00
Negative externality (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.45 15.22 1 0.19 0.666 0.00
Age in years −0.87 331.68 1 4.06 0.044 0.01
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) −0.14 2.92 1 0.04 0.850 0.00
Siblings (0 = no, 1 = yes) −0.61 43.44 1 0.53 0.466 0.00
Degree father (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.24 4.59 1 0.06 0.813 0.00
Degree mother (0 = no, 1 = yes) −2.91 437.81 1 5.36 0.021 0.01
School ma 372.45 6 4.56 <0.001 0.04
Faith ma 246.03 3 3.01 0.030 0.02
Honesty scale −0.49 48.40 1 0.59 0.442 0.00
Error 81.63 603
aMultiple coefficients, individual coefficients not reported.
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It is possible that our self-report scale only predicted cheating behav-
ior in the sender–receiver game because both measures are, in con-
trast to the dice-box task, language-based measures and to some
extent directly observable. Additionally, the self-report scale used in
this study may have been narrower in scope than other measures. For
example, recent analyses have shown that the honesty–humility per-
sonality factor from the HEXACO scale strongly predicted dishonest
behavior in experimental tasks for adults (Heck, Thielmann,
Moshagen, & Hilbig, 2018). Further systematic, large-scale studies are
needed to investigate the relation between behavioral and self-
reported honesty measures in adolescents.
Our combined analysis of data from all three studies showed that
over-reporting in the dice-box task decreased with age. These results
are in line with previous findings for this age group which found a
decrease in cheating rates from late childhood throughout adoles-
cence (Evans & Lee, 2011; Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015;
Maggian & Villeval, 2016). One previous study did not observe age
effects in 5- to 15-year-olds, possibly because the study included a
relatively small sample over a wide age range (Bucciol & Piovesan,
2011). Moreover, we found that adolescents in the control condition
in Study 1 over-reported 27.7% of the maximum possible number of
eyes, which is only somewhat higher than the average cheating rates
found for adults in a recent meta-analysis (Abeler et al., 2016).
Our combined analysis further revealed that gender had no signif-
icant effect on over-reporting. To date, evidence for gender differ-
ences in adolescents' cheating behavior is mixed, with some studies
finding no effects (Evans & Lee, 2011; Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer,
2015; Maggian & Villeval, 2016) and other studies showing significant
gender differences (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018; Markiewicz & Gawryluk,
2019). We found that adolescents whose mothers had a university
degree over-reported fewer points. There was no effect of paternal
education—possibly, because mothers are often the primary care-
givers. Maternal education may have positively influenced adoles-
cents' own academic performance, and higher academic achievement
has been linked to reductions in cheating behavior (Ruffle & Tobol,
2017). Faith also influenced over-reporting, though this effect was
mainly due to reduced over-reporting by a small group of participants
of Buddhist faith and we are hesitant to draw strong conclusions from
this small sub-sample. We also found that over-reporting varied
between schools, yet to date we cannot say which aspects of the
school environment resulted in this variation. Overall, these findings
open up exciting avenues for future studies on dishonest behavior in
F IGURE 8 Distribution of individual dice
results across studies split by round number and
condition. The areas of squares are proportional to
relative frequencies. Average scores across rounds
are summarized in the bottom row [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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academic settings (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018) such as the role of school
environments or adolescents' academic performance.
Negative externalities (Study 2) and incentives for competition
(Study 3) had no significant impact on cheating rates or the effec-
tiveness of the promise intervention. Past research has revealed a
mixed picture of the effect of negative externalities on cheating or
bribery (Abbink et al., 2002; Barr & Serra, 2009; Maggian, 2019;
Meub et al., 2016; Senci et al., 2019). Our findings are in line with
recent work showing similar cheating rates when cheating reduces
the experimenter's budget and when it reduces donations to a
charity (Maggian, 2019). Furthermore, although past research has
identified a positive relation between competition and academic
cheating (Whitley, 1998) and found that competition can increase
unethical behaviors (e.g., Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Vriend et al.,
2016), we found no effect of incentives to compete on cheating
rates. Although participants knew that there was an incentive to
perform better than everyone else, they did not receive direct
feedback on their own performance or their ranking within the
school (Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006; Woike & Hafenbrädl, 2020).
Future studies could investigate the effects of rank feedback on
cheating in adolescents.
Participants in our study attended English middle schools and
were tested in the main language of instruction (English) because we
wanted to investigate dishonesty in academic settings. English is one
of the two official languages in India. Generally, linguistic diversity is
the norm in India and children regularly encounter more than one lan-
guage in their everyday lives. Previous research with adults has found
that testing participants in their second (non-native) language affected
moral judgements and cheating in an experimental task
(Bereby-Meyer et al., 2018; Geipel et al., 2016). For example,
Bereby-Meyer et al. (2018) found that adults from Israel, Korea, Spain,
and the United States cheated less in their second language as com-
pared with their native language. However, it is currently unclear
whether findings from predominantly monolingual settings can be
applied to the Indian context. Future work could determine whether
language has an impact on levels of honesty in multilingual settings.
Our newly developed cheating paradigms offer a series of advan-
tages over previous paradigms: The dice-box game and the child-
friendly version of the sender–receiver game can be easily employed
across a wide age range—from late childhood to old age—to explore,
for example, dishonest behavior across the life span (Mata, Josef, &
Hertwig, 2016) or its inter-generational transmission (Chowdhury,
Sutter, & Zimmermann, 2018). Furthermore, the dice-box game is very
portable, easy to implement and does not require a computer setup or
other technical equipment. It can thus be employed both in the lab
and under challenging field settings. It also gives each participant the
protection of reasonable doubt by producing no electronic or paper
trails of true results—in fact, observation is impossible. This has the
advantage that participants can play the dice-box game in full view of
the experimenters or other participants. Even in environments, where
other researchers use deceptive paradigms, the logical impossibility of
observation in the dice-box task should reassure participants that
their responses cannot be fact-checked.
To conclude, we implemented two new, child-friendly variants of
cheating measures and demonstrated the effectiveness of a new
promise intervention to promote more honest behavior. Importantly,
all measures employed in the current study are deception-free. Given
the ethical mandate to avoid participant deception when in any
way feasible (American Psychological Association, 2017), the mea-
sures used in our study have a privileged claim of fulfilling ethical
standards of psychological experimentation. Our paradigms also
address concerns about deceptive practices negatively impacting
participants' trust and performance (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001, 2008),
which seems particularly appropriate in studies on honesty and
trustworthiness.
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